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Full Faith and Credit, More or Less, to Judgments: 
Doubts About Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. 
STEWART E. STERK* 
Workmen's compensation awards, decrees of administrative tribu-
nals rather than courts, present the question of how far the mandate 
of the full faith and credit clause should reach and whether the 
clause should bar a claimant from pursuing supplemental compen-
sation in a second state. Recently, in Thomas v. Washington Gas 
Light Co., the Supreme Court decided that full faith and credit 
should not prevent a claimant from obtaining supplemental compen-
sation. Professor Sterk criticizes the Court's analysis, demonstrating 
the Thomas Court's neglect of the federal interests that the clause 
should protect. After examining the clause and its policy un-
derpinnings, Professor Sterk concludes that decisions of administra-
tive tribunals should be entitled to the same full faith and credit that 
court judgments receive. 
An injured employee seeks and recovers a workmen's compensation award 
for injuries suffered during the course of his employment. 1 Subsequently, 
realizing that he would be treated more generously by the compensation law 
of a neighboring jurisdiction in which he has also performed work for his 
employer, the employee seeks a supplemental award. The defendant pleads 
the earlier award as a bar to further relief in the second state. Since 1943 the 
Supreme Court has addressed three times the effect of the full faith and credit 
clause2 on the the second state's power to award supplemental compensation. 3 
The Court's most recent effort, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,4 leaves 
the issue in a state of considerable uncertainty, largely due to the inability of 
more than four justices to agree on any one position.5 Moreover, and perhaps 
more importantly, the opinions of the justices, particularly the plurality 
• Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B. 1973, J.D. 
1976, Columbia University. 
I. The typical workmen's compensation act includes the following features: (a) the employee 
automatically has a right to certain benefits when he suffers personal injury arising out of and in the course 
of employment; (b) negligence and fault are immaterial; (c) arbitrary maximum and minimum dollar 
limits; (d) the employee surrenders his common-law rights to sue his employer for the injury; (e) 
administration is in the hands of administrative commissions that employ relaxed rules of procedure, 
evidence, and conflict-of-laws; and (t) the employer is required to obtain private insurance, state-fund 
insurance or self-insurance. I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1978). 
2. The United States Constitution provides that: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general 
laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. 
3. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Industrial Comm'n v. Mccartin, 330 
U.S. 622 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). 
4. 448 U.S. 261 (1980). 
5. Justice Stevens delivered a plurality opinion that Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun joined. 
Id. at 263. Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined, concurred in the 
judgment. Id. at 256. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. Id. at 290. 
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opinion of Justice Stevens, raise implications for full faith and credit analysis 
that extend far beyond workmen's compensation cases. 
Thomas raises two important issues. The first is whether determinations by 
workmen's compensation boards and other administrative tribunals should be 
accorded the same status as judgments of courts for purposes of the full faith 
and credit clause. 6 The second is whether and to what extent the policies or 
interests of individual states may control the applicability of the full faith and 
credit clause. The three opinions in the Thomas case indicate little agreement 
on either issue. 7 
This article seeks to resolve both issues. The article begins by explaining the 
full faith and credit decisions that set the precedential background of the 
Thomas case, as well as the Thomas Court's disposition of those precedents. 
After examining the state interests and policy foundations that underlie the 
full faith and credit clause, the article then discusses the applicability of those 
principles beyond the context of court judgments to the rulings of administra-
tive bodies. Finally, the article reaches two conclusions with respect to the 
issues raised in Thomas. First, the article concludes that the policies embodied 
in the full faith and credit clause require that administrative adjudications 
receive the same full faith and credit as the judgments of a court. Second, the 
article argues that only national policies, not interests of individual states, 
should serve to limit the scope of the full faith and credit clause as it applies to 
judicial proceedings. 
I. THE Magnolia-Mccartin DISTINCTION 
When the United States Supreme Court considered Thomas, it did so under 
constraint of two major precedents: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt8 and 
6. Full faith and credit has long required that "the judgment of a state court should have the same 
credit, validity and effect, in every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was 
pronounced .... " Hampton v. McConnell, 16 U.S. 234, 235, 3 Wheat. 110, 111 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.), 
quoted in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. at 270. This principle is codified in a federal 
statute which provides that "Acts, records and judicial proceedings ... [of any state] shall have the same 
full faith and credit in every court within the United States .. . as they have by law or usage in the courts of 
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). 
7. Regarding the first issue, Justice Stevens wrote that there are "critical differences" between a court 
judgment and a workmen's compensation award, the former tribunal having general jurisdiction and the 
latter having no power to consider the laws of other states. 448 U.S. at 281-82. Justice White, however, saw 
no "overriding differences between workmen's compensation awards and court judgments that justify 
different treatment for the two." Id. at 289 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring in 
judgment). Justice Rehnquist also "fail[ed] to see" why the first award should not be given "the same full 
faith and credit as would be afforded a judgment entered by a court of general jurisdiction." Id. at 294 
(Rehnquist, J., with Marshall, J. , dissenting). 
Concerning the second issue, Justice Stevens identified the protection of states' interests as constituting 
the primary purpose of the full faith and credit clause. Id. at 280. Accordingly, he framed the ultimate 
question in Thomas as "whether Virginia's interest in the integrity of its tribunal's determinations 
forecloses a second proceeding to obtain a supplemental award in the District of Columbia." Id. Justice 
White, on the other hand, recognized two other major purposes of the full faith and credit clause: the 
"principle of finality" of judgments, and the provision of a "nationally unifying force." Id. at 288-89 
(White, J. , with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Rehnquist rejected the 
plurality's attempt to balance state interests, reiterating the Constitution's simple mandate that public acts, 
records and judgments be given full faith and credit. Id. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., with Marshall, J ., 
dissenting). 
8. 320 U.S. 430 (1943). 
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Industrial Commission v. McCartin.9 Because of an apparent inconsistency 
between these two cases and because of their significance to Thomas, an 
analysis of the Thomas issues must begin with a discussion of both Magnolia 
and Mccartin. 
A. MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO. 11. HUNT 
Hunt, employed in Louisiana to assist in the drilling of oil wells, traveled to 
Texas where he suffered an injury from a falling drill stem. 10 He sought and 
received a workmen's compensation award in Texas. 11 Pursuant to this Texas 
award, the employer's insurer made the required compensation payments. 12 
Upon discovering that the Louisiana workmen's compensation law13 was 
more generous to injured workmen than the comparable Texas statute, 14 
Hunt sought to recover compensation in Louisiana. 15 In response, the 
defendant contended that res judicata principles, given constitutional force 
through the full faith and credit clause, barred any award under the Louisiana 
statute. 16 Nevertheless, the Louisiana District Court granted Hunt a judg-
ment for the compensation specified in the Louisiana workmen's compensa-
tion statute, less a setoff for the amount of the Texas payments.17 The 
Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed, 18 and the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
denied review. 19 The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Stone, reversed, holding that the Louisiana judgment had denied full 
faith and credit to the earlier Texas workmen's compensation award.20 
Justice Stone began his analysis in Magnolia by noting that under Texas 
common law a workmen's compensation award is entitled to the same full 
faith and credit as a judgment of a court, and is res judicata as to all matters 
actually litigated or "which could have been litigated with respect to the right 
to compensation for the injury."21 Justice Stone noted that consequently, 
Texas did not permit its own courts to award a second recovery for a single 
injury.22 Louisiana law, he added, appeared to be similar in not permitting a 
second recovery of compensation for a single injury.23 So much was not in 
dispute. 
9. 330 U.S. 622 (1947). 
10. 320 U.S. at 432. 
II. Id. 
12. Id. at 433. 
13. At the time of the action, the applicable Louisiana law was LA. GEN. STAT. tit. 34, ch. 15, §§ 4391-
4409 (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23 :1021-1063 (West 1964 & Supp. 1981)). 
14. TEX. REV. c,v. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309 (Vernon 1967). 
15. 320 U.S. at 433. 
16. Id. at 433-34. 
17. Id. at 434. 
18. 10 So. 2d 109, 115 (La. Ct. App. 1942). 
19. 320 U.S. at 434. 
20. Id. at 446 (5-4 decision). 
21. Id. at 435; accord, Ocean Accident & Goar. Corp. v. Pruitt, 58 S.W.2d 41 , 44-45 (Tex. Comm. App. 
1933) (final unappealed decision by Industrial Accident Board entitled to same faith and credit as 
judgment of court; decision res judicata as to every point parties might have brought forward). 
22. Cf 320 U.S. at 436 (not contended that Louisiana any more than Texas, permits own courts to 
award second recovery for second injury). Under Texas law, an employee who has received compensation 
in another state may not recover in Texas. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cason, 132 Tex. 393, 396, 124 S.W.2d 321 , 
322 (1939); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980-81). 
23. Cf 320 U.S. at 436 (not contended that Louisiana, any more than Texas, permits own courts to 
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The Court rejected Hunt's argument that despite the full faith and credit 
clause, Louisiana's interest in providing a Louisiana resident with the 
measure of recovery allowed by its own laws permitted a supplemental 
award.24 This contention, in the Court's view, ignored the distinction, "long 
recognized and applied by this Court, " 25 between according full faith and 
credit to judgments and giving the same full faith and credit to local statutory 
law.26 
Justice Stone observed that "[t]he full faith and credit clause and the Act of 
Congress implementing it have, for most purposes, placed a judgment on a 
different footing from a statute of one state, judicial recognition of which is 
sought in another."27 He justified this difference in treatment on the ground 
that res judicata principles are not involved when the issue is full faith and 
credit to statutes. Each state has constitutional authority to enact its own 
laws,28 and res judicata policies do not provide a basis for choosing between 
states' conflicting statutes.29 Once a claim has been litigated in one state, the 
Court concludeq, the full faith and credit clause carries res judicata across 
state lines and assures that "a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as 
conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other state as in that where the 
judgment was rendered .... "30 
Finally, Justice Stone addressed Hunt's contention that the Louisiana suit 
rested on a cause of action different from that pursued in Texas. Hunt 
asserted that a different cause of action existed because his Texas claim and 
remedy were predicated on the Texas statute, whereas the Louisiana claim 
rested on the Louisiana statute. As Justice Stone noted, however, each statute 
provided the same grounds for recovery.31 The Court recognized that Hunt's 
theory would allow a plaintiff to bring as many lawsuits as there are states 
that would, and constitutionally could, apply their local law to the activity 
involved. Moreover, this. result would apply whether the issue involved were 
workmen's compensation, or tort, or breach of contract. 32 Therefore, under 
award second recovery for single injury). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. The full faith and credit clause does not require a state to substitute another state's law for its 
own. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-501 (1939) (state 
where injury occurred may apply own compensation law rather than that of state where employer and 
employee contracted for employment); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 
532, 540-42 (1935) (state of employer and employee may apply own compensation law rather than that of 
state where injury occurred). 
27. 320 U.S. at 437. 
28. Id. at 436. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 439. Nevertheless, in Magnolia the Court conceded the possibility of exceptional cases in 
which a state legitimately might ignore a sister-state's judgment and relitigate issues previously resolved. 
Id. at 438. The Court simultaneously warned, however, that any limited exceptions were not for the states 
to create, but were for the Supreme Court, as the ultimate interpreter of the full faith and credit clause, to 
fashion. Id. Thus, a state court may not decline, based on its own perception of a particularly strong state 
policy, to enforce a sister-state's judgment. In a state's desire to furnish additional compensation to an 
injured workman, the Court perceived no policy sufficiently important to warrant an exception to the 
mandate of the full faith and credit clause. Id. 
31. Id. at 444. 
32. Id. at 445. Justice Stone's opinion pointed out that "it has never been thought that an actionable 
personal injury gives rise to as many causes of action as there are states whose laws will permit a suit to 
recover for the injury . . . . " Id. 
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the Magnolia theory, as long as the grounds for recovery are the same, the 
existence of two workmen's compensation statutes that constitutionally could 
be applied to the injury should not permit a second recovery for a plaintiff 
who has already received an award in a sister state. 
Four justices dissented in Magnolia, two of whom wrote opinions. Justice 
Douglas argued that the Court should accommodate the interests of Louis-
iana and Texas by construing the Texas award as a regulation of the 
relationship of the parties "only so long as they remained subject to the 
jurisdiction of Texas."33 Under his theory, the Texas proceeding had not 
adjudicated Hunt's rights under his Louisiana employment contract, and 
should not preclude further litigation upon his return to Louisiana. 34 Justice 
Black's dissent was much broader in scope. He emphasized that more than 
one state may have an interest in a workmen's compensation award, and was 
unwilling to differentiate between the scope of the full faith and credit clause 
as applied to statutes and its scope as applied to judgments. 35 
The majority opinion in Magnolia expressly left open the effect of the Texas 
award in Louisiana if the Texas courts had held that an award of compensa-
tion in another state would not bar an award in Texas.36 The Court's 
observation is curious, because the holding in Magnolia itself would require 
the Texas courts to bar further recovery once a sister state had rendered a 
compensation award. The apparent paradox, however, can be explained. The 
treatment in Texas of sister-state awards, in the Supreme Court's view, was 
relevant to the intended effect of Texas compensation awards in sister states.37 
Therefore, the Court must have reasoned that if Texas courts did not consider 
sister-state awards binding in Texas courts, then most likely Texas awards 
were not intended to be binding in sister-state courts. Thus deciphered, the 
open question was whether an award that the rendering state did not intend to 
bar a subsequent sister-state award must nevertheless do so under the 
constitutional command of full faith and credit. 
B. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v. McCARTIN 
Four years later, Industrial Commission v. McCartin38 presented the 
question that Magnolia had left open. Kopp, an Illinois bricklayer, contracted 
in Illinois to do work in Wisconsin for McCartin, an Illinois employer. 39 
Kopp was injured in Wisconsin and filed a claim with that state's industrial 
commission. 40 When the defendants objected to the jurisdiction of the 
Wisconsin Commission, Kopp filed a claim with the Industrial Commission 
of Illinois, seeking resolution of the jurisdictional question.41 The Wisconsin 
33. Id. at 449 (Douglas, J ., with Murphy J., dissenting). 
34. Id. at 448. . 
35. Id. at 455-56 (Black, J., with Douglas, Murphy & Rutledge, JJ. , dissenting). 
36. Id. at 430. Under Texas law an employee may not recover in Texas ifhe has received compensation 
for the injury in another state. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cason, 132 Tex. 393, 396, 124 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1939); 
TEX. REV. CJV. STAT. ANN. art. 8~06, § 19 (Vernon 1967). 
37. The majority opinion in Magnolia relied on the finding of the Louisiana court that the Texas award 
had res judicata effect in Texas. Id. at 443. The Court acknowledged that if the original award had not been 
res judicata in Texas, full faith and credit would not have barred a subsequent recovery. Id. 
38. 330 U.S. 622 (1947). 
39. Id. at 623. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 624. 
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commission notified the parties that under Wisconsin law, Kopp could claim 
compensation under the Illinois act42 and then again in Wisconsin, with a 
setoff in Wisconsin for amounts paid under the Illinois statute.43 Kopp and 
Mccartin agreed to a settlement of all claims arising under the Illinois act, 
with the express provision that "(t]his settlement does not affect any rights 
that applicant may have under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State 
ofWisconsin."44 The Illinois Commissioner approved the settlement contract, 
and Kopp received payment in Illinois.45 
Before Kopp could pursue his second claim in Wisconsin, the United States 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Magnolia. 46 In response to Magnolia, 
McCartin filed an amended answer in which he contended that the full faith 
and credit clause barred the Wisconsin proceedings. 47 The commission 
nevertheless granted Kopp a supplemental award. After the Wisconsin courts 
set aside the award on authority of Magnolia,48 the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari49 and reversed unanimously. 50 
The Court distinguished Magnolia on the ground that the Illinois award, 
unlike the Texas award in Magnolia, was not intended to foreclose Kopp's 
rights to recover under other states' workmen's compensaton legislation.51 
Unlike Texas law, Illinois law gave no indication that an award by that state 
was "made explicitly in lieu of any other recovery for injury."52 The Court 
concluded that only "unmistakable language" in a state's statute or judgment 
would justify a finding that one compensation award was intended to preclude 
additional recoveries in other states. 53 In addition, the Court based its 
conclusion on the language of the Illinois award, which explicitly reserved 
Kopp's rights in Wisconsin.54 This reservation established that the Illinois 
award, consistent with the Court's reading of the Illinois statute,55 was 
42. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-138.27 (Smith-Hurd 1969). 
43. 330 U.S. at 624. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 625. The Illinois Commissioner informed Kopp that he did not know what effect the 
reservation of rights in Wisconsin would have, but Kopp agreed to "take chances on Wisconsin," id., in 
order to benefit from the lump-sum settlement. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Mccartin v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522 (1946), rev'd, 330 U.S. 62 (1947). 
49. 329 U.S. 696 (1946). 
50. 330 U.S. at 630. Justice Rutledge concurred in the result. Id. 
51. Id. at 626-27. The Mccartin Court noted the express finding in Magnolia that the Texas workmen's 
compensation law precluded a second recovery in any other state. Id. at 626. In fact, however, what the 
Magnolia Court actually found was that the Texas law would not allow a recovery in Texas if the employee 
had received compensation elsewhere. See note 36 supra and accompanying text (discussing Court's 
construction of Texas workmen's compensation law). Nevertheless, by implication the converse also may 
be true. 
52. 330 U.S. at 626. Illinois law provides that "[n]o common law or statutory right to recover damages . 
. . for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, 
other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions 
of this Act .... " ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (Smith Hurd 1969 & Supp. 1980-81). The Court found 
"nothing in the statute or in the decisions thereunder to indicate that it is completely exclusive ... . " 330 
U.S. at 627. 
53. Id. at 628. The Court noted that workmen's compensation laws are liberally construed in 
furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted-the benefit of the employee. Id. 
54. 330 U.S. at 628-29. 
55. See note 52 supra (discussing Court's interpretation of Illinois law). 
1981] FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 1335 
intended only to bar further claims in Illinois, not a supplemental workmen's 
compensation award in Wisconsin. 56 Thus, in the Court's judgment, Magnolia 
did not constitute controlling precedent for McCartin. 
Thus, until Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,57 there was a tension 
between the Supreme Court's precedents on the applicability of full faith and 
credit to workmen's compensation awards. Under Magnolia, the second state 
must give full faith and credit to a workmen's compensation award of the 
rendering state. 58 Mccartin qualified that rule severely by holding that full 
faith and credit principles apply only if the law of the rendering state contains 
"unmistakable language" indicating the state's intention to bar subsequent 
awards.59 Because few workmen's compensation statutes contained the 
"unmistakable language" required in Mccartin, the Magnolia rule was of 
little effect. 60 Yet Magnolia and McCartin continued to coexist. 
C. THE DISTINCTION AND ITS DEMISE 
The distinction between the two cases rests on the intended extraterritorial 
effect of the workmen's compensation award. Because under Texas law the 
award_in Magnolia was intended to bar an additional remedy elsewhere, a 
second award in Louisiana was impermissible; because under Illinois law the 
Illinois award in McCartin was not so intended, the subsequent Wisconsin 
award did not violate the full faith and credit clause. 
Implicitly, the Mccartin distinction rests on the premise that only one 
purpose underlies the full faith and credit clause: the promotion of respect for 
sister-state judgments. If this were the sole purpose of the clause, the 
distinction would be unassailable, because it gives each state judgment the 
effect that the state has intended. The Mccartin premise, however, is 
incorrect. 
As courts have long recognized, respect for sister-state judgments is not the 
only policy that the full faith and credit clause advances, nor is it even the 
primary one. Justice Stone emphasized as early as 1943 that the full faith and 
credit clause is a "nationally unifying force" 61 that restricts the rights of 
otherwise independent sovereignties "by making each an integral part of a 
single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given 
nation-wide application. " 62 
56. 330 U.S. at 630. 
57. 448 U.S. 261 (1980). 
58. See notes 20-30 supra and accompanying text (discussing Magnolia holding). 
59. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text (discussing McCartin holding). 
60. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. at 274 & n.21 (because Illinois statute 
construed in McCartin typical of most states' laws, Magnolia had little practical effect after McCartin). The 
Thomas Court observed that only Nevada's statute appears to contain the unmistakable language required 
under Mccartin. Id. 
61. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. at 439; see Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948) 
(purpose of clause to transform aggregation of independent states into nation); Milwaukee County v. M.E. 
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935) (purpose of clause to make several states integral parts of single 
nation); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 161 
(1949) (purpose of clause to create unified nation by altering status of otherwise independent states). 
62. 320 U.S. at 439. Dissenting in Magnolia, Justice Douglas agreed that "[t]he command of the full 
faith and credit clause frequently makes a reconciliation of the two [states'] interests impossible. One must 
give way in the larger interest of the federal union." Id. at 447 (Douglas, J ., with Murphy, J ., dissenting). 
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Permitting individual states to determine the extraterritorial effect of their 
own judgments is inconsistent with this policy of national unification. If, for 
example, a state were to enact a statute providing that all the state courts' 
judgments in tort actions would have no extraterritorial effect, a plaintiff 
could relitigate his tort claim in any sister state that could exercise jurisdiction 
over the defendant, thereby thwarting the policy of national unification. 63 
Two contrary judgments arising out of the same-set -of facts could stand 
within the same nation. The possibility of conflicts would be great, especially 
if some states intended their judgments to have extraterritorial effect and 
others did not. 64 Such conflicts might be tolerable, for lack of an alternative, 
in an association of independent sovereignties. Within our federal system, 
however, it was just such difficulties that the full faith and credit clause was 
designed to eliminate. 
The alternative to permitting states to determine the extraterritorial effect 
of their judgments is, of course, a resort to the basic federal policy underlying 
the full faith and credit clause: the need to join many individual sovereignties 
into a national union. Recognizing that the basic question is a federal one does 
not mean, however, that the states have no role in determining the extraterri-
torial effect of their own judgments. By determining the effect of a judgment 
within the state, a state may determine indirectly the extraterritorial effect of 
its judgment. 65 This is true because the federal mandate, as expressed in the 
statute implementing the full faith and credit clause, 66 requires sister states to 
give judgments the same effect that they would have within the rendering 
state.67 Nevertheless, the rendering state should not be permitted to dif-
ferentiate between the effect its judgments have abroad and their effect at 
home, because such differentiation runs counter to the need for unification 
embodied in the full faith and credit clause. Consequently, no state should be 
permitted to prescribe directly, as a matter of state law, the extraterritorial 
effects of its judgments. 
It is this criticism of the Magnolia-Mccartin distinction that underlies the 
plurality opinion in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. In Thomas, a 
District of Columbia employee suffered a back injury while working in 
63. Assume, for example, that state X rendered a judgment for the plaintiff in a tort action. Unless the 
defendant had assets within that state, the plaintiff's judgment, under the terms of the statute, would be of 
no use to him because sister states would give no effect to the judgment. In order to secure redress, the 
plaintiff would be required to relitigate the dispute in another state. Conversely, if the defendant prevailed 
in state X, that judgment would not protect him from subsequent actions in other states. Clearly, neither 
result would be consistent with the needs of the nation as a whole. 
64. Suppose, for instance, state X, having declared that its judgments are entitled to no extraterritorial 
effect, were to award a judgment to the defendant in a civil action. Subsequently, the plaintiff, after 
relitigating the same cause of action in state Y, receives a judgment. If the plaintiff seeks to enforce state Y's 
judgment in state X , should he prevail? Full faith and credit would require state X to enforce the Y 
judgment, because Y's judgment was not limited in territorial scope. Yet the courts of state X would be 
unlikely to ignore the existing X judgment. Moreover, the last-in-time rule ofTreinies v. Sunshine Mining 
Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) would not resolve the issue because the basis for the Treinies holding, the 
opportunity to litigate the validity of the first judgment in the second state, would not exist if all the parties 
conceded in the state Y proceeding that the judgment of state X was valid, but irrelevant to the Y 
proceedings because of the X statute. 
65. The statute implementing the full faith and credit clause requires only that a judgment receive the 
same effect outside the state as it would receive within the rendering state. See note 6 supra (quoting 
pertinent parts of federal statute). 
66. 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1976). 
67. Id. 
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Virginia. 68 After receiving a compensation award in Virginia he sought 
supplementary compensation in the District of Columbia. 69 The administra-
tive law judge in the District of Columbia granted the supplementary award 
despite the defendant's contention that the Virginia award excluded any other 
recovery.7° Relying upon the full faith and credit clause, however, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a Benefits Review 
Board order upholding the supplemental award. 71 
Although Justice Stevens' opinion for the plurality in Thomas conceded 
that "Mccartin by its terms rather than the earlier Magnolia decision, is 
controlling as between the two precedents,"72 the plurality declined to rest its 
decision on that ground. Instead, the plurality acknowledged that the 
Mccartin rule "represents an unwarranted delegation to the States of this 
Court's responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith and credit 
questions,"73 and embarked on a reconsideration of Magnolia and Mccartin. 
Faced with conflicting precedents, the Court first examined the constraints 
that the doctrine of stare decisis imposed upon the Court's disposition of 
Thomas. 14 Recognizing that McCartin "all but overruled Magnolia,"15 the 
Court concluded that the doctrine of stare decisis would not be served either 
by attempting to revive Magnolia or by attempting to preserve the uneasy 
coexistence of the two cases. 76 Freed from the fetters of stare decisis, the 
plurality chose to analyze the case by considering the state interests involved. 
In the plurality's view, three specific interests were at stake: the interest of 
Virginia in limiting the potential liability of employers doing business within 
the state's borders, the interest of both Virginia and the District of Columbia 
in the welfare of the injured employee, and the interest of Virginia in the 
respect accorded its determinations by other sovereigns. 77 The Court evaluat-
ed these three interests and concluded that none should preclude a supple-
mental award in the District of Columbia. 78 Because this conclusion was 
68. 448 U.S. at 264. 
69. Id. at 265. 
10. Id. 
71. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Thomas, 598 F.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 448 U.S. 261 (1980). 
72. 448 U.S. at 269. The applicable Virginia statute provides that " [t]he rights and remedies herein 
granted ... shall exclude all other rights and remedies .. . at common law or otherwise .... "VA. CODE § 
65.1-40 (1980). Justice Stevens noted that although this provision is not identical to the Illinois statute in 
Mccartin, it contains no "unmistakable language" that precluded supplementary compensation. 448 U.S. 
at 269. The absence of such language led him to believe that McCartin was the controlling precedent. Id. 
73. Id. at 271. Before McCartin, the Supreme Court had established the principle that "[t]his Court 
must determine for itself how far the full faith and credit clause compels the qualification or denial of rights 
asserted under the laws of one state, that of the forum, by the statute of another state." Pacific Employers 
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,502 (1939). Inevitably, the McCartin rule conflicted 
with this principle. 448 U.S. at 271. 
74. Id. at 272. 
15. Id. at 271 n.70. 
16. Id. at 277. In addition, the Thomas Court recognized that the Magnolia holding was in direct 
conflict with the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. See id. (under Restatement, prior workmen's 
compensation award no bar to proceeding in another state; amount of first award credited on second) 
(citing RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 403 (1934)). 
77. 448 U.S. 277. 
78. Id. at 286. The first interest was not controlling because the employee initially could have sought 
compensation in either jurisdiction against the same employer. Id. at 280. The employer and the insurer 
"would have had to measure their potential liability exposure by the more generous of the two workmen's 
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incompatible with Magnolia but could coexist with Mccartin, the plurality 
concluded that Magnolia should be overruled. 79 
Concurring in the judgment, three members of the Court advocated 
retaining the Magnolia-Mccartin distinction, in deference to principles of 
stare decisis. 80 Nevertheless, the concurring opinion of Justice White found 
Magnolia to be the "sounder doctrine" and suggested that Mccartin rested 
"on questionable foundations." 81 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, characterized 
the Mccartin case as "analytically indefensible" and advocated a return to the 
Magnolia rule. 82 In light of this split in the Court, the current status of the 
Magnolia-Mccartin distinction is somewhat uncertain, although it undoub-
tedly has been discredited analytically. 
Despite the range of views expressed in the various Thomas opinions, what 
is more important for present purposes is the analysis in the plurality opinion. 
In deciding that the Virginia workmen's compensation award did not bar a 
subsequent District of Columbia award, the plurality evaluated the state 
interests "affected by the potential conflict between Virginia and the District 
of Columbia."83 Because a supplementary award in the District of Columbia 
would not adversely affect Virginia's interests, the plurality held that full faith 
and credit did not bar the second award.84 In addition, the plurality 
questioned the Magnolia Court's conclusion that full faith and credit rules 
applicable to judgments generally are equally applicable to workmen's 
compensation awards. 85 It is these two features of the plurality opinion-the 
emphasis on state interests in determining the application of the full faith and 
credit clause and the questioned applicability of full faith and credit principles 
to workmen's compensation awards-that provide the focus of the remainder 
of this article. 
II. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE: 
THE ROLE OF STATE INTERESTS 
The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the full faith and credit clause 
is an instrument of national unification, designed to help create a nation out of 
what were once independent sovereign states.86 Any unification process 
compensation scheme in any event." Id. The second interest, that of the injured workman, clearly did not 
foreclose successive awards and constituted an interest common to both jurisdictions. Id. Virginia's interest 
in the integrity of its decisions did not require the denial of a second award for two reasons. First, the 
District of Columbia proceeding did not involve the relitigation of Virginia's factual determinations. Id. at 
281 ; see note 158 infra and accompanying text (discussing Thomas Court's conclusion that only factual 
findings entitled to res judicata effect). Second, the jurisdictional limitations on an administrative tribunal 
empower it to establish rights only under the laws of its own state. 448 U.S. at 282. 
79. Id. at 286. A total of five other justices concluded that Magnolia should not be overruled. See id. at 
289 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring); id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., with Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
80. 448 U.S. at 289 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell. J., concurring in judgment). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting). 
83. Id. at 277. 
84. Id. at 286. 
85. Id. 
86. E.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 (1943); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 
U.S. 287, 294 (1942); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935). 
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requires some sacrifice by the individual components to satisfy the require-
ments of the union; so it is with the full faith and credit clause. The command 
of the clause necessitates the occasional subordination of one state's interests 
to those of the union. The difficulty lies in determining when the circum-
stances require sacrifice by the individual states in favor of the common goal, 
and when they do not. 
A. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO STATUTES 
Until Thomas, the Supreme Court had embarked on a line of full faith and 
credit analysis that drew a sharp distinction between the role of state interests 
depending on whether judgments or statutes were involved.87 A broad reading 
of the Thomas case, however, suggests a blurring of that distinction, a 
blurring that is unwarranted in light of the policies that underlie full faith and 
credit. 
The Constitution itself makes no distinction between the full faith and 
credit to be given to "public Acts" and that to be accorded "judicial 
Proceedings.88 The statute implementing the.constitutional provision,89 how-
ever, did draw a distinction.90 Judicial proceedings, according to the statute, 
were entitled to "such faith and credit given them in every court within the 
United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from 
whence the said records are or shall be taken."91 No parallel provision defined 
the scope of full faith and credit to statutes. During the 1948 recodification 
Congress, apparently without any intention to work a change in the law, 
amended the statute to place judicial proceedings and public acts on the 
same footing. 92 Whatever the literal language of the Constitution and the 
statute, the question remains whether any interests of the forum state may be 
sufficiently strong to justify that state's refusal to give effect to a sister state's 
statutes that would be, and constitutionally could be, given effect in the sister 
state. 
87. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,296 (1942) (full faith and credit clause does not 
compel courts of one state to subordinate local interests to statutes of other states); Pacific Employers Ins. 
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500 (1939) (full faith and credit clause does not compel 
one state to enforce statutes of another); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 
532, 550 (I 935) (same). 
Id. 
88. For text of the full faith and credit clause, see note 2 supra. 
89. Act of May 26, 1790, I Stat. 122, ch. 11, § 1. 
90. The wording of the statute is ambiguous: 
§ I. Be it enacted, &c, That the acts of the legislatures of the several states shall be 
authenticated by having the seal of their respective states affixed thereto: That the records and 
judicial proceedings of the Courts of any state shall be proved or admitted, in any other court 
within the United States, by the attestation of the Clerk .... And the said records and judicial 
proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them, in 
every court within the United States, as they have, by law or usage, in the courts of the states 
from whence the said records are, or shall be, taken. 
91. Id. 
92. A provision of the amendment incorporated, in passing, public acts as well as judicial proceedings: 
"[t]hat all provisions of this act, and the act to which this is a supplement, shall apply as well to the public 
acts, records, ... [and]judicial proceedings ... of the respective territories ... as to [those] ... of the several 
states." Act of March 27, 1804, I Stat. 298, ch. 61, § 2. 
--
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The language of the full faith and credit clause leaves unclear precisely 
what it means to give a sister state's statutes the same full faith and credit they 
receive in the sister state. The most literal analysis would require that the 
forum apply the sister state's statute in any case where, on the same facts, the 
sister state would deem the statute applicable. Whatever the theoretical 
plausibility of such a rule, however, its practical result would be nonsensical. 
Whenever two states had enacted rules by their terms applicable to the same 
controversy, each state's courts, by the mandate of full faith and credit, would 
be forced to ignore the local law in favor of the contrary law of the sister 
state.93 Not only would such a rule frustrate the interests of each state, but 
perhaps more importantly, the rule would do nothing to advance the policy of 
national unification that underlies the full faith and credit clause. Such a rule, 
of course, has never warranted serious consideration. 
Another possible reading of the full faith and credit clause, and one that 
would make the clause an instrument of national unification, would construe 
the clause to mean that constitutionally only one state's law may govern any 
single transaction and that one law must receive full faith and credit in all 
other states. In effect, this interpretation would make choice of law a 
constitutional discipline governed entirely by the full faith and credit clause. 
One set of choice-of-law rules would apply to any controversy arising 
anywhere in the United States, no matter where in the United States the 
action might be brought. Although the Supreme Court generally has not 
adopted this approach, the Court has adopted it in at least one·area.94 
Although constitutionalizing choice-of-law would promote national unifi-
cation, the Supreme Court appears to have retreated from its earlier 
inclination to adopt that approach.95 At least two reasons support the Court's 
retreat from using the full faith and credit clause as an instrument for 
nationalizing choice of law. The first is the enormous burden that the Court 
would bear in hearing and deciding choice-of-law cases from every jurisdic-
tion, especially in an era of competing choice-of-law theories and disagree-
ment over the judicial function in resolving choice-of-law controversies.96 
93. As the Court has explained: 
A rigid and ritual enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to the 
statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the 
statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own. 
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). 
94. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947), for example, may indicate 
that under full faith and credit principles membership rights in fraternal benefit corporations are governed 
only by the law of the state of incorporation. See id. at 589 (six-month limitation barring death benefits 
claim valid in state of incorporation although such limitation void under law of forum state). Yet the recent 
case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) leaves the authority of Wolfe in a dubious state. See 
id. at 319-20 (when decedent and insurer had substantial contacts with Minnesota no full faith and credit 
clause violation in Minnesota court's applying Minnesota law to claim on Wisconsin insurance policy for 
death in Wisconsin of Wisconsin resident). 
95. Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 319-20 (1981) (choice-of-law question resolved 
by examining interests of forum state and fairness) with New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 
376-377 (1918) (under fourteenth amendment valid contract executed in New York concerning insurance 
policy executed in Missouri could not be rendered ineffective by Missouri). 
96. In Allstate Ins. Co. v Hague, 449 U.S. at 306-07, for example, the Court noted that the forum state 
had adopted the analytical framework for resolving choice-of-law questions proposed by Professor Leflar. 
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Considerations of federalism suggest the second reason. As the Court has 
remarked: 
[T]he very nature of the federal union of states, to which are 
reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to 
the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state 
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing 
with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legis-
late.97 
Thus, the Court has recognized that requiring complete uniformity is neither 
desirable nor permissible under the concept of federalism. 
Although the Supreme Court has not made choice-of-law a constitutional 
discipline, the Court has never suggested that the states are free to fashion 
choice-of-law doctrine without reference to constitutional limitations. Recent 
cases in which the Court upheld state choice-of-law decisions indicate 
unmistakably that some constitutional restrictions on choice of law remain. 98 
In this regard, the interests or policies of the several states have assumed 
considerable importance. In many cases more than one state has an interest or 
policy that would be frustrated by an inability to apply its own rule. 
Apparently recognizing that in such cases there is no single "correct" method 
for resolving the dispute, the Court has permitted any state with sufficient 
interest in or connection with a dispute to apply its own rule.99 The focus, ..-.. 
then, has been on whether an individual state has an interest that justifies 
application of its own rule despite the existence of a contrary rule applied in 
another jurisdiction. 
This focus on states' interests, broadly defined, is unavoidable when 
considering the application of full faith and credit to public acts. When one 
See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267,282 (1966) (factors 
include predictability, interstate order, simplification of judicial task, advancement of forum's interests, 
and applying better rule of Jaw). The Court declined to evaluate this theory and restricted its role to 
determining whether the state had acted within its constitutional authority. 449 U.S. at 307. Even if the 
Court were to adopt a set of apparently rigid choice-of-Jaw rules, the opportunity for state and lower 
federal courts to manipulate individual cases to fit one or another of those rules would likely be great 
enough to keep the Court well-stocked with choice-of-law cases. 
97. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939). 
98. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) (Court's sole function to determine 
whether state court's choice of its own Jaw exceeded federal constitutional limitations); Nevada v. Hall, 440 
U.S. 410, 421 (1979) (full faith and and credit clause requires each state to give effect to official acts of other 
states unless in violation ofown public policy); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1964) (State's 
ample contacts with transaction sufficient to justify application of its law without violation of full faith and 
credit or due process). 
99. The Supreme Court has most recently articulated its standard as whether the forum state has "a 
significant aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests, such that 
application of its law [is] neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 
302, 320 (1981). Dissenting in Hague, Justice Powell nevertheless articulated a similar approach: "In short, 
examination of contacts addresses whether the state has an interest in the application of its policy in this 
instance .... If it does, the Constitution is satisfied." Id. at 334-35 (Powell, J ., with Burger, C.J . & 
Rehnquist, J ., dissenting) (quoting B. Currie, The Constitution and Choice of Law; Governmental Interest 
and Function, in SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS 189 (1963)). 
In his concurring opinion in Hague Justice Stevens suggested a somewhat different formulation : "the 
[full faith and credit] Clause should not invalidate a state court' s choice of forum law unless that choice 
threatens the federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of 
another State." Id. at 323 (Stevens, J ., concurring). 
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state as sovereign asserts an interest in applying its legal rule to a particular 
dispute, the full faith and credit clause cannot justify forbidding that state to 
do so unless the sovereignty of a sister state is thereby aff ected. 100 Even if a 
sister state has a sovereign interest in a controversy, the only way to resolve 
that conflict is to weigh the respective interests of the two states or to leave 
each state free to pursue its own policies. 101 No federal policies can provide a 
basis for frustrating the sovereign interests of one state rather than those of 
another. 
Without first declaring choice of law to be a strictly constitutional 
discipline, the Court cannot decide questions of full faith and credit to public 
acts unless it evaluates the interests, broadly defined, of the states involved. 102 
I 00. Professor Martin has emphasized that the full faith and credit clause requires respect and 
deference to the sovereign interests of other jurisdictions, not to the personal rights of parties. See Martin, 
A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 151, 153 (1976) (advocating full faith and credit 
approach rather than fairness approach to conflicts cases because former focuses on interest of states other 
than forum); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 192, 196 
(1976) (same) [hereinafter Martin, Constitutional Limitations]. See also Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process 
and Full Faith in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 119-120 (1976) (explaining full faith and credit 
limitations on choice-of-Jaw determinations). Professor Martin's analysis suggests, of course, that if no 
other jurisdiction has a sovereign interest in a particular resolution of a dispute, the forum should be free 
from full faith and credit constraints in deciding what rule of Jaw to apply. 
In his concurring opinion in Hague, Justice Stevens set out the following formulation of full faith and 
credit limitations: 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause ... [directs] that a State, when acting as the forum for 
litigation having multistate aspects or implications, respect the legitimate interests of other 
States and avoid infringement upon their sovereignty. The Clause does not, however, rigidly 
require the forum state to apply foreign law whenever another State has a valid interest in the 
litigation. On the contrary, in view of the fact that the forum State is also a sovereign in its 
own right, in appropriate cases it may attach paramount importance to its own legitimate 
interests. 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Stevens 
suggested an additional basis for upsetting a choice-of-Jaw decision: arbitrariness or fundamental 
unfairness to a litigant in violation of the due process clause. Id. at 326-31. 
IO I. This article makes no attempt to enumerate what connections with a state would suffice to give the 
state a sovereign interest in a dispute. The analysis pursued in this article does not depend on any particular 
parochial conception of a state interest, such as the one espoused by proponents of the governmental 
interest analysis. The Supreme Court might employ various criteria to determine whether a state has an 
interest in a particular dispute that is sufficient to justify the application its own Jaw. Once the Court 
decides that a state has such an interest it cannot forbid the state to apply its own Jaw unless the Court 
chooses to balance the various states' interests, and concludes that application of that state's Jaw would 
cause more significant frustration of the interests of other states. 
102. If all choice-of-law decisions were a question of constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court could 
decide them without reference to state interests. Federal principles, as yet undeveloped, could guide choice-
of-law decisions that were independent of any state interests. Under this approach, a state's rule could 
govern even if the state were to disclaim any sovereign interest in the controversy. Such a constitutional 
choice-of-law system, however, is inconsistent with the prevalent notion that the full faith and credit 
clause, as applied to public acts, stands as a protection of state sovereignty. See note 100 supra (discussing 
importance of interests of non-forum states). 
Even if one views the full faith and credit clause as a protection against arbitrariness and fundamental 
unfairness, as the plurality opinion in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 320, suggests, an evaluation of 
state interests is still necessary. The plurality opinion in Hague implies that if a state has a sovereign 
interest in a dispute, application of its own Jaw will not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. See id. 
(because Minnesota had significant aggregation of contacts with parties and occurrence that created state 
interests, applying Minnesota Jaw neither arbitrary nor unfair). 
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Suppose, for example, the Court were to rule that full faith and credit to 
public acts required simply that each state enforce rights recognized in the 
state where the last act necessary to create liability arose. 103 A ruling of this 
kind would place considerable reliance on notions of territorial sovereignty, 
and would be the very antithesis of the governmental interest analysis favored 
by many modem scholars. 104 Yet a ruling of this type would be, in effect, a 
decision that the occurrence of the last act within a state gives that state alone 
a sovereign interest in having its law applied. 105 No other sovereign would 
have the territorially-based interest necessary to claim that a decision against 
applying its own rules undermined the state's sovereignty. The sovereign 
"interests" involved are not those Professor Currie had in mind, but it is these 
interests on which territorialist conflicts doctrine is based. 106 
Similarly, if the Supreme Court were to concede that more than one state 
might have a sovereign interest in applying its law to a particular dispute, the 
103. See Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 145 (1934) 
(choice-of-law analysis in fidelity bond case gave place where bond written controlling interest despite 
possibly greater contacts with other state). 
104. Professor Brainerd Currie developed a method for resolving choice-of-law cases, a method widely 
known as "governmental interest analysis." See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: 
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958). Currie's approach requires 
courts to identify the state policies that underlie the competing legal rules before resolving a choice-of-law 
dispute. Id. at 9-10. Currie termed these state policies "governmental interests." Id. at 10. For a brief 
general description of Currie's method of resolving choice-of-Jaw dispqtes, see W. REESE & M. 
ROSENBERG, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAW 469-72 (7th ed. 1978). 
Currie refined his approach through a series of articles. See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssA vs ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) (reprinting most of Professor Currie's articles on governmental interest 
methodology). With various modifications, his theory has gained many academic adherents. See generally 
Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California: A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 719 (1974); 
Sedler, Weintraub's Commentary on the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Torts, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1229 
(1972); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. I (1963). In addition, the 
California Supreme Court has adopted Currie's approach as the predominant method of resolving choice-
of-Jaw questions in California. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 319-21 & n.2, 546 P.2d 719, 
722-23 & n.2, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 218-19 & n.2 (1976) (applying Currie's methodology to determine 
whether California or Nevada law should govern personal injury action). 
105. If that state concluded, however, that it had no sovereign interest in the dispute, the full faith and 
credit clause provides no warrant for undermining that conclusion. Experience demonstrates, however, 
that this situation is unlikely to arise. The Supreme Court has never been asked, under the guise of full faith 
and credit, to require an unwilling state to apply its own Jaw. 
106. The territorialist theory, which is based on vested rights that accrue upon the occurrence in a 
jurisdiction of the last act necesary to create a cause of action, dominated conflicts theory of the first half of 
the twentieth century. Its principal champion was Professor Joseph Beale, who served as the Reporter for 
the first Restatement. See generally J. BEALE, CoNFLICT Of LAWS (1935); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS Ch. 8 & 9 (1934). 
By contrast, Professor Currie's method minimizes the importance of territorial connections in favor of a 
policy-oriented approach, with particular significance attached to forum policies. Currie's governmental 
interests are those that a "selfish state, concerned only with promoting its own interests" would pursue. B. 
CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 89 (1963). According to Currie, when a litigant 
invokes a foreign state's law: 
the court should, first of all, determine the governmental policy expressed in the Jaw of the 
forum. It should then inquire whether the relation of the forum to the case is such as to 
provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the application of that policy. This 
process is essentially the familiar one of construction or interpretation. 
Id. at 183-84. 
-
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Court could not resolve the dispute without considering the asserted interest 
of the states involved. In such a situation, the Court could, on one hand, 
conclude that the dispute must be resolved by weighing those interests. 107 
Conversely, the Court could hold that any state with an interest in the 
controversy may apply its own rule of decision. 108 In either event, the Court 
could proceed only after first deciding whether the choice-of-law question 
presented an affront to sovereign interests, however defined, and then 
deciding whether despite the full faith and credit clause, the forum state's 
interest permitted overriding the sovereign interests of the other states. 
Whether the application of a sister state's law would unconstitutionally 
frustrate the sovereign interests of a state is a question of federal law. 109 Thus, 
the interests of a sovereign state that the full faith and credit clause protects 
must be federally defined interests. The role of federal policies or interests in 
determining the scope of full faith and credit to public acts is otherwise quite 
limited. There are only two issues that are federal in nature. The first is 
whether an asserted state interest is a cognizable interest for full faith and 
credit purposes. The second is whether the competing state interests should be 
weighed or whether the law of any state may be applied without additional 
constitutional restriction so long as that state does have an interest. There are 
no overriding federal policies that can resolve issues of full faith and credit to 
statutes without evaluating state interests. The Supreme Court cannot resolve 
questions of full faith and credit to public acts by allowing federal policies to 
prevail over the interests of either state, or of both. 
B. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO JUDGMENTS 
The role of state interests in determinations of full faith and credit to 
statutes has been the focus of much judicial consideration. Until the Thomas 
case, the Supreme Court had not accorded comparable attention to state 
interests in cases involving full faith and credit to judgments. Some notable 
dissents have argued that, in certain circumstances, sister-state judgments 
that frustrate the interests of the forum state need not receive full faith and 
credit. 110 No Court majority, however, has so held. 
107. In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, the Court explained that: 
[T]he conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit 
clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the 
other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale 
of decision according to their weight. 
294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). 
108. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (state must have significant contact 
creating state interests); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979) (forum state had closely related and 
substantial interest). 
109. A caveat is necessary. If a state disclaims any sovereign interest in having its law applied to a 
particular dispute, there is no constitutional reason to override that disclaimer. Only when more than one 
jurisdiction asserts a sovereign interest should the resulting conflict implicate federal law. 
110. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,459 (1943) (Black, J., with Douglas, Murphy 
& Rutledge, JJ., dissenting) (when two states have interest in workmen's compensation litigation, effect of 
decision should be for states to determine); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202,219 (1933) (Stone, J., 
with Cardozo, J., dissenting) (full faith and credit does not require obligations of one state to be placed 
beyond control of others, without regard to their interests). 
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There are two reasons for according full faith and credit to sister-state 
judgments even if the interests of the forum state are thereby frustrated. First, 
unlike the situation with full faith and credit to public acts, a court can decide 
issues of full faith and credit to judgments without weighing state interests. A 
blanket rule that the prior judgment binds the parties throughout the United 
States resolves disputes without any consideration of state interests. Second, 
and more important, a rule permitting a state, on the basis of its own 
important interests, to readjudicate matters resolved by a sister-state's 
judgments would undermine the federal policies that underlie the full faith 
and credit clause. The full faith and credit clause is designed to avoid multiple 
and contradictory judgments in the several states. 111 The uncertainty inherent 
in a system that allows different courts within one nation to apply different 
rules of law to the same dispute is unfortunate. That uncertainty is trivial, 
however, when compared to the chaos that would result if different and 
contradictory judgments could co-exist in different states within the same 
nation. Enforcement problems would abound if the states were free to ignore 
judgments of sister states. Parties could not obtain a final determination of 
their rights without bringing actions in every state that had the jurisdiction to 
entertain them. In short, without some method of eliminating the possibility 
of conflicting judgments, the situation would be intolerable. 
Nevertheless, the solution to the problem need not require according full 
faith and credit to the first valid judgment rendered. Another approach would 
be to grant judicial jurisdiction only to the state with the greatest interest in a 
particular controversy, or to accord full faith and credit only to judgments 
rendered by the state with the greatest interest, however defined. Alternative-
ly, courts could give full faith and credit to determinations of any state with 
an interest, whether or not it is the greatest interest. These solutions, however, 
would create different problems of significant dimension. 
The alternative of permitting only the state with the greatest interest to 
make final judicial resolution of a controversy, for example, has several 
drawbacks. First, that state's courts may not have jurisdiction over the 
case. 112 Second, even if those courts could properly exercise jurisdiction, the 
forum might be seriously inconvenient for one or more parties, particularly 
for a party with limited resources. Third, ascertaining which state possessed 
the greatest interest would require litigation on that issue in every case. 
Because the issue would be one of federal law, a final resolution by the 
Supreme Court would be necessary in many disputed cases. Of course, even 
under established principles, full faith and credit questions are ultimately 
federal questions. Nevertheless, the only federal question that currently arises 
in most full faith and credit cases-whether the first forum's courts had 
jurisdiction 113 -does not approach the complexity of deciding in each case 
Ill. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348-49(1942). 
112. Because the bases for jurisdiction are broader now than they have been in the past, this possibility 
is less likely than it once was. The recent case of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 
(1980), however, illustrates that the situation can arise. See id. at 299 (because defendant Jacked adequate 
contacts with state in which accident occurred, that state Jacked jurisdiction over products liability action). 
113. A second forum is free to re-examine the jurisdictional basis of a sister state's judgment. The 
finality of sister state's judgments "does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court in which 
the original judgment was given, to pronounce it; or the right of the State itself to exercise authority over 
the person or the subject-matter." Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall .) 457, 462 (1874) (quoting J. 
STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed. Boston 1858)). 
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which state has the greatest interest in a particular controversy. Finally, in 
light of the Supreme Court's position that even questions of full faith and 
credit to statutes do not require a balancing of state interests, 114 it would be 
inconsistent to establish an inflexible "state of greatest interest" test for 
questions of full faith and credit to judgments. The affront to a state's 
sovereignty is likely to be at least as great if the state's judgments, rendered 
after due deliberation by competent courts, are ignored because another state 
has a greater interest. 
Some of these problems would be alleviated if the Court were to require full 
faith and credit only for judgments of states with any interest, not necessarily 
the greatest interest. This solution would eliminate the inconsistency with the 
established law that governs the applicability of full faith and credit to 
statutes. Under this approach, the problems of judicial jurisdiction and 
inconvenience to parties might be of lesser dimension, but they still would 
exist. Most importantly, under this theory a federal question other than the 
jurisdictional one would remain, thus requiring a decision as to whether the 
first forum had any interest, rather than the greatest interest, in the dispute. 
An additional problem is inherent in any attempt to grant full faith and 
credit only to judgments of states with an interest or the greatest interest in a 
dispute: the need to reduce each case into its component issues. Choice-of-law 
theory recognizes that different states may have greater interests in the 
different issues that arise in a particular controversy.1 15 Few systems could be 
more unwieldy than one that would permit different states to reach final 
resolutions of different issues within a particular case. The burden and 
inconvenience both to the parties and to the judicial system would be great, 
and the confusion intolerable. On the other hand, without a segregation of the 
various issues in dispute, an interest analysis would be of dubious utility. 
In addition to these practical problems, an interest analysis would present 
serious jurisprudential obstacles. Such an approach ignores the sovereign 
interests of the several states in adjudicating disputes between parties over 
which they have jurisdiction.' 16 Surely the Court would commit a serious 
affront to the sovereignty of a state by requiring it to abstain from 
adjudicating the rights of two parties seeking redress in its courts on the 
ground that another state has a greater interest. The authority to resolve 
disputes between parties over whom the sovereign has power is one of the 
basic attributes of sovereignty itself. 117 In a federal system, it is one thing to 
114. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text (explaining Court's refusal to require one state to 
defer to the conflicting laws of another state). 
115. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws explains: "The rights and liabilities of the parties 
with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, 
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (emphasis added). 
I I 6. When a sister state's statutes alone are involved, it is unnecessary to evaluate a sovereign's 
executive or judicial interests: the forum state merely exercises its judicial power in deciding which statutes 
ought to be applied. To suggest that a sister state's interest should prevent the forum state from even 
hearing the case, however, requires a substantial leap. 
117. See generally J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Chapter IX, of the 
Ends of Political Society and Government, § 127. Similarly, in Pennoyer v. Neff the Supreme Court stated: 
[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property 
within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the 
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require that one sovereign state honor adjudications made by another 
coordinate state; it is quite another to require that a sovereign state with 
power over the parties abstain from dispute resolution entirely, or at best limit 
itself to adjudication subject to veto by the courts of a co-equal state. In short, 
an interest analysis of full faith and credit for judgments is inconsistent with 
our notion of personal jurisdiction and the concept of sovereignty that 
underlies it. 11s 
The principal alternative to an interest analysis is a system based, as ours 
has been, on uniform adherence to the first judgment rendered by a court with 
jurisdiction. This practice satisfies the major requirement of a federal system 
by providing a unifying principle that avoids the confusion of conflicting or 
contradictory judgments in various states of the union. Moreover, it furthers 
other federal policies as well. It keeps duplicative litigation to a minimum by 
permitting the first court that may properly exercise jurisdiction to resolve a 
dispute finally, instead of deferring to a court in a state posessing a greater 
interest in the dispute, or rendering a judgment that will be, in effect, subject 
to the review of a sister state's court. In addition, a jurisdiction-based rule 
limits significantly the scope of litigation, in both the initial court that renders 
judgment as well as courts that entertain challenges to that judgment. No 
federal question arises regarding the sufficiency of a state's interest to resolve 
a dispute. Thus, a jurisdiction-based rule assures smooth functioning of the 
federal system by reducing both the number and the complexity of matters 
litigated in multiple cases. 
These advantages, of course, exact a price. In some cases, a state with an 
interest in a particular dispute will be foreclosed from considering a dispute 
by an earlier adjudication in a state having an interest of equal, or possibly 
lesser, significance. It is this price that a plurality of the Supreme Court was 
unwilling to pay in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. In an opinion which, 
narrowly construed, applies only to workmen's compensation awards, Justice 
Stevens indicated that an interested state need not be bound by all determina-
tions made in a sister-state proceeding, but only by determinations of fact. 119 
Thus, the opinion attempted to reconcile the interests of individual states. If, 
as appears likely, the Court intended this reconcilitation to apply only to 
civil status and capacities of its inhabitants .... [T]o enforce an extra-territorial jurisdiction by 
a [sister state's] tribunals, would be deemed an encroachment upon the independence of the 
State in which the persons are domiciled or the property is situated, and be resisted as 
usurpation. 
95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1878). 
118. In the context of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court recently explained: 
[T]he Framers . . . intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, 
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of 
each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its Sister States-a 
limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (restrictions on personal jurisdiction consequence of territorial limitations on power of 
states). 
119. See 448 U.S. at 281 ("unexceptionable" full faith and credit principle that resolutions of factual 
matters underlying judgment must be given same res judicata effect in forum as they have in rendering 
state). 
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workmen's compensation awards or even to all administrative determina-
tions, 120 the distinction between those and other judgments rests on shaky 
foundations. 121 If, on the other hand, the opinion's reach is broader, extending 
to all judgments, Thomas fails to consider how so limiting the scope of full 
faith and credit will frustrate federal interests. 
Justice Stevens began his "fresh examination of the full faith and credit 
issue"122 in Thomas by noting that "[t]hree different state interests are 
affected by the potential conflict between Virginia and the District of 
Columbia."123 Although he ultimately concluded that permitting the District 
of Columbia to make a supplementary award of workmen's compensation 
benefits would frustrate no state interest of Virginia, 124 Justice Stevens never 
addressed the federal interests that were frustrated by upholding the second 
award. This is particularly surprising because in the same opinion, Justice 
Stevens rejected the rationale of Mccartin as an "unwarranted delegation to 
the States of this Court's responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith 
and credit questions." 125 Stripped to its essentials, however, Mccartin stood 
only for the proposition that if a state expressly disavows an interest in 
precluding subsequent supplementary workmen's compensation awards, sis-
ter states, out of respect for the disavowed interest, need not refrain from 
making such awards. 126 If the Supreme Court's role in full faith and credit 
cases is limited to evaluating the interests of the several states, the McCartin 
rule is an eminently sensible one. There can be no reason for the Supreme 
Court to conclude that a particular state has an interest in precluding 
supplementary awards if that state itself has expressly disclaimed such an 
interest. 127 
The foregoing discussion does not suggest that the Mccartin rule is 
analytically defensible. The rule is indefensible not because states should be 
prevented from deciding conclusively that they have no interest in precluding 
further litigation, but because the interests of the rendering state are not the 
only interests that dictate against relitigating issues. Federal policies and 
interests are involved, and it is those policies and interests that are embodied 
in the full faith and credit clause. Even if a particular state were unconcerned 
with the effect of its judgments in sister states, the federal interest in assuring 
the smooth functioning of the federal system nationwide would require that 
judgments of that state be given effect elsewhere. As Reese and Johnson wrote 
more than thirty years ago, "[f]ull faith and credit is a national policy, not a 
state policy. Its purpose is not merely to demand respect from one state for 
120. The Thomas Court summarized its holding as follows: "The Full Faith and Credit Clause should 
not be construed to preclude successive workmen's compensation awards." Id. at 286. In his analysis , 
however, Justice Stevens discussed the limitations of administrative tribunals generally, thereby implying 
that Thomas applies equally to all administrative decisions. See id. at 281-82 (discussing differences 
between court judgments and administrative determinations). 
121. See notes 164-80 infra and accompanying text (criticizing attempts to distinguish administrative 
from judicial proceedings in application of full faith and credit). 
122. 448 U.S. at 277. 
123. Id.; see note 78 and accompanying text (interests include placing limit on employer's liability, 
providing employee with adequate remedy, and upholding integrity of first state's decision). 
124. Id. at 284. 
125. Id. at 271. 
126. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text (discussing McCartin holding). 
127. See notes 102-10 supra and accompanying text (discussing analogous problem with full faith and 
credit to statutes). 
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another, but rather to give us the benefits of a unified nation by altering the 
status of otherwise independent, sovereign states"12s 
In light of the federal policies that Justice Stevens ignored, the position he 
took in Thomas loses much of its appeal. Conflicting judgments, regardless of 
whether they arise from the application of differing rules of law or different 
findings of fact, equally undermine the policy of national unification. The 
resulting disorder in the federal system is no greater in one case than in the 
other. Litigation in one state would not finally determine the rights of the 
parties as long as the same set of facts might give rise to different legal 
consequences in the courts of another state. In most circumstances, there 
would be no means of choosing between the judgments of the two states 
unless the Supreme Court could conclude as a matter of federal law that the 
judgments of one state would frustrate sovereign interests of the other, but not 
the reverse. 
As long as the full faith and credit clause is viewed as an instrument for 
implementing the federal policy of national unification, determining the 
extent of state interests remains an issue of diminished importance. A reading 
of the Supreme Court precedents until Thomas leads to the conclusion not 
only that state interests are less significant than federal policies but that they 
might be irrelevant entirely.129 Only competing federal policies, therefore, 
would justify failing to give effect to a sister state's judgment. One need not go 
that far, however, to conclude that Justice Stevens' analysis in Thomas, if 
intended to apply beyond workmen's compensation awards, misses almost 
entirely the point of the full faith and credit clause. 
Moreover, as long as the Supreme Court continues to view full faith and 
credit to public acts as a relatively insignificant restriction on the constitu-
tional power of the forum state to apply its own law, 130 requiring the 
enforcement of sister-state judgments will cause little additional frustration of 
sovereign interests. The Court's unwillingness to federalize choice-of-law 
questions through the full faith and credit clause indicates a lack of federal 
concern with frustration of state interests caused by the application of the law 
of a state having less interest than a sister state. If the needs of the federal 
128. Reese & Johnson, supra note 61, at 161-62, quoted in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 
U.S. at 271 n.15. 
129. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943) (no considerations of local 
policy sufficient to impair force that full faith and credit clause gives to judgments); Yarborough v. 
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 212 (1933) (alimony decree binding under full faith and credit clause despite 
second state's interest in providing increased award to its resident); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236-
37 (1908) (judgment on gambling debt binding under full faith and credit clause despite illegality of 
contract in second state). In Williams v. North Carolina the Supreme Court explained the applicability of 
the full faith and credit clause to divorce decrees in these terms: 
It is objected, however, that if such divorce decrees must be given full faith and credit, a 
substantial dilution of the sovereignty of other states will be effected. For it is pointed out that 
under such a rule one state's policy of strict control over the institution of marriage could be 
thwarted by the decree of a more lax state. But such an objection goes to the application of the 
full faith and credit clause to many situations. It is an objective in varying degrees of intensity 
to the enforcement of a judgment of a sister state based on a cause of action which could not 
be enforced in the state of the forum. . . . Such is part of the price of our federal system. 
317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942). 
130. See note 97 supra and accompanying text (full faith and credit does not require one state to 
substitute another state's laws for its own). 
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system do not prevent a forum state from so frustrating a sister state's greater 
interest there is also no federal reason to prevent frustration of sister-state 
interests by enforcing everywhere the forum judgment that is based on forum 
law. 131 
Requiring enforcement of sister state judgments, whatever law the sister 
state may have applied, generally does not create significant unfairness for 
parties or potential parties to litigation, a concern of comparable significance. 
The party who brings the original action normally has some choice of forum, 
at least when more than one state has a significant interest in the outcome of 
the litigation. Although the constitutional power of the state to apply its own 
law to a particular dispute does not necessarily imply judicial jurisdiction in 
that state, 132 in most cases a state with a significant interest in applying its 
own law is likely to possess jurisdiction as well. 133 If a plaintiff has sufficient 
faith in the judicial process of a particular state to submit his claim to 
litigation there, he ought not later be able to complain of the resolution of that 
dispute. This is particularly true when the plaintiff could have brought his 
action in another state. 
The same argument, of course, does not apply to a defendant in the first 
litigation, except perhaps if jurisdiction in that action depended upon his 
express consent. Whatever the effect accorded to sister-state judgments, as 
long as states are free in most instances to apply their own laws, defendants 
must submit to an adjudication based on the law of the plaintitrs chosen 
forum. Even if a sister state were not obliged to enforce such a judgement, the 
defendant would still be subject to the original forum's enforcement mecha-
nisms. If the forum state has applied its law to an unwilling defendant in this 
manner, requiring sister states to enforce the first forum's judgment will 
represent a minimal incremental imposition. 
The preceding discussion does not suggest that parties will never suffer 
prejudice as a result of the enforcement of sister-state judgments. It suggests 
only that in light of other impositions already condoned in our federal system, 
the prejudice some parties would endure as a result of such a rule would not 
be unreasonable. In addition, full faith and credit to public acts, and perhaps 
due process, 134 protect both the parties and interested states from at least the 
13 I. The Court's choice-of-law decisions place few limits on the ability of the forum state to apply its 
own law to a case in its courts. See note 95 supra and accompanying text (discussing Court's deference to 
state's choice oflaw). The Court, therefore, is willing·to frustrate sovereign interests of sister states even in 
disputes that have relatively little connection with the forum. Permitting the sister state to ignore the forum 
judgment would significantly alleviate that frustration, but the cost to the federal system in permitting such 
a course would be quite high. 
132. See note 112 supra and accompanying text (discussing possibility that state possessing greatest 
interest may lack jurisdiction over dispute). 
133. This generally will be true except in instances where the primary basis for a state's application of 
its own law is the plaintiffs domicile, an insufficient basis for judicial jurisdiction. See International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945) (court may obtain jurisdiction over defendant only ifhe has 
minimum contacts with forum state). See also Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. 
L. REV. 872, 879 (1980) (suggesting minimum contacts test for legislative jurisdiction). 
134. The majority and concurring opinions in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague discuss the interplay between 
the two clauses in the choice-of-law area. See 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (full faith and credit and due process 
clauses satisfied when application of law neither arbitrary nor unfair); id. at 323-26 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (full faith and credit protects federal interest in national unity; due process ensures fairness to 
litigants). See also Kirgis, supra note 100, at 96, 110 (full faith and credit prevents excessive provincialism; 
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grossest forms of parochialism on the part of sister states. These considera-
tions together indicate that from the standpoint of the parties, enforcement of 
sister-state judgments, whatever the law applied, is not inherently unfair. 
C. SUMMARY 
The role of state interests in full faith and credit cases should, and until the 
Thomas case unquestionably did, depend on whether the issue involved full 
faith and credit to public acts or full faith and credit to judicial proceedings. 
In the context of full faith and credit to public acts, an analysis of state 
interests is necessary to determine the obligations of sister states. The same is 
not true, however, with respect to full faith and credit to judicial proceedings. 
Evaluating the interests of individual states in determining whether sister-
state judgments must be enforced is not only unnecessary, but also inconsist-
ent with the basic needs of the federal system. The long accepted, if sometimes 
qualified, rule is that a judgment rendered by a court with judicial jurisdiction 
must be enforced in every sister state, whatever the interests of the sister state. 
Implicit in that rule is the recognition that full faith and credit is a federal 
policy designed to ensure national unification, and a policy to which 
competing state policies or interests must be subordinated. No superior 
alternative to the established rule has emerged that would not involve the 
subordination of federal full faith and credit policies. 
Ill. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
An alternative explanation for the plurality's conclusion in Thomas is 
Justice Stevens' apparent rejection of the Magnolia premise135 that adminis-
trative adjudications are entitled to the same res judicata effect as court 
judgments. 136 In Magnolia, even the Louisiana Court of Appeals, despite its 
denial of full faith and credit to the Texas workmen's compensation award, 
recognized that the award stood on the same footing as a court judgment. 137 
Although the United States Supreme Court reversed, the Court reaffirmed 
that principle.13s 
In Thomas, however, Justice Stevens wrote that "the critical differences 
between a court of general jurisdiction and an administrative agency with 
limited statutory authority forecloses [sic] the conclusion that constitutional 
rules applicable to court judgments are necessarily applicable to workmen's 
due process prevents unfairness and arrogation of power); Martin, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 
100, at 192 (full faith and credit regulates relations among states; due process regulates relations between 
state and individual); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1590 (1987) (full faith and 
credit operates affirmatively to compel states to entertain certain suits or apply certain laws; due process 
operates negatively to forbid application of law without reasonable basis). 
135. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 443 (1943). 
136. See 448 U.S. at 281 (Magnolia's reliance on precedent as requiring that workmen's compenS<1,tion 
awards stand on same footing as court judgments unwarranted). 
137. Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 10 So. 2d 109, 112-13 (La. Ct. App. 1942), rev'd, 320 U.S. 430 
(1943). 
138. See 320 U.S. at 443 (regardless of whether accident board proceeding a "judicial proceeding" or 
"record," Texas award entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana). 
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compensation awards." 139 This statement warrants further analysis in light of 
existing case law and the policies behind full faith and credit. 
A. THE CASE LAW: SCHENDEL, MAGNOLIA AND McCARTIN 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. Schendel, 140 decided in 1926, 
provided precedent for the Court's statement in Magnolia that workmen's 
compensation awards are entitled to the same full faith and credit as court 
judgments. 141 The plurality in Thomas, however, read Schendel narrowly, as 
holding only that factual findings of state administrative tribunals are entitled 
to the same res judicata effect as findings by a court. 142 
In Schendel a railroad's negligence caused the death of one employee, 
Hope, and the injury of another, Elder. 143 For each employee, the railroad 
instituted an administrative proceeding under the Iowa workmen's compen-
sation statute. 144 Both Hope's widow and Elder responded by asserting that 
the state law did not apply because the company and its employees were 
engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident. 145 They brought 
actions in Minnesota, seeking recovery under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act (FELA), 146 which requires as a jurisdictional predicate a finding that 
employer and employee were engaged in interstate commerce. 147 
Before completion of the trial on the FELA claim in Minnesota, the Iowa 
administrative tribunal found that Hope had been engaged only in intrastate 
commerce, and awarded compensation to his widow.148 After administrative 
and judicial review, judgment was entered affirming the compensation 
award. 149 Months later, the FELA action resulted in a judgment for the 
employee.1 50 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, thereby rejecting the 
railroad's contention that under the full faith and credit clause the Minnesota 
courts were not permitted to relitigate the jurisdictional issue that already had 
been resolved in the Iowa compensation proceeding. 151 The other Iowa 
administrative proceeding, involving the employee Elder had not yet reached 
its conclusion when the Minnesota court rendered a judgment in Eider's favor 
on his FELA claim. 152 The Minnesota Supreme Court again affirmed. 153 
139. 448 U.S. at 281. 
140. 270 U.S. 611 (1926). 
141. See id. at 617 (state determination of applicability of state workmen's compensation law barred 
subsequent action under federal law in another state). 
142. See 448 U.S. at 281 (Schendel involved "unexceptionable" full faith and credit principle that 
resolutions of factual matters underlying judgment must be given same res judicata effect they would have 
in rendering state). 
143. 270 U.S. at 612. 
144. Id. at 614, 622-23. 
145. Id. at 614, 623. Although coverage under the Iowa workmen's compensation law is elective, both 
Elder and Hope had chosen to be covered. Id. at 613. 
146. Pub. L. No. 60-101 , 71 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976)). 
147. Id. 
148. 270 U.S. at 613. 
149. Id. at 614-15. 
150. Id. at 615. 
151. Id. Significantly, even the Minnesota Supreme Court, which had permitted relitigation of the 
jurisdictional issue, had not differentiated between judicial and workmen's compensation proceedings. See 
generally id. at 615. 
152. 163 Minn. 457, 458, 204 N .W. 557, 558 (1925), affd, 210 U.S. 611 , 623 (1926). 
153. Id., 204 N.W. at 558. 
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed Elder and reversed, on full faith 
and credit grounds, the Hope decision. 154 The Court concluded that in Elder 
there was not yet an administrative award enforceable in the Iowa courts at 
the time of the Minnesota FELA judgment and therefore the Minnesota 
courts were entitled to reach an independent determination. 155 Res judicata 
principles and, derivatively, full faith and credit principles did not bar Eider's 
claim because of the absence of a final judgment. 156 In the Hope case, 
however, where there was an enforceable award and even a court judgment 
affirming the award, the Court concluded that "[t]he Iowa court . . . having 
adjudicated the character of the commerce in which the deceased was 
engaged, that matter, whether rightly decided or not, must be taken as 
conclusively established, so long as the judgment remains unmodified." 157 
According to the Thomas plurality, Schendel articulated no more than the 
"unexceptionable full faith and credit principle" that determinations of fact 
made in one state's proceeding are entitled to the same res judicata effect in 
sister states as in the rendering state. 158 The Thomas plurality characterized 
the Iowa determination that Hope had been engaged in intrastate commerce 
as a factual finding.1s9 
The conclusion that Hope was engaged in intrastate commerce, however, is 
not merely a finding of fact. It is at least a mixed conclusion of law and fact 
that embraced both the factual determination that Hope performed certain 
activities within Iowa and the legal conclusion that certain legal consequences 
attached to these activities. 160 It is the legal aspect of this mixed conclusion 
that prevented the Minnesota courts from relitigating the issue. 
An illustration may provide clarification. Suppose in the Iowa proceeding 
the tribunal had found only that for five days before his accident, Hope had 
been working exclusively in Iowa on a project within Iowa. Suppose this 
finding were necessary to support a particular remedy within Iowa, but the 
magic words "intrastate commerce" were never attached to the finding. The 
Iowa finding would not bar a Minnesota court faced with an action brought 
under FELA from concluding that the employee was nevertheless injured in 
the course of interstate commerce. First, the Minnesota court could find that 
other facts, neither litigated in nor relevant to the Iowa proceeding placed the 
154. 270 U.S. at 615. 
155. Id. at 622-23. 
156. Id. at 623. 
157. Id. at 617. 
158. 448 U.S. at 281. 
159. Id. 
160. The demarcation between issues of fact and issues of law is not clear. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment j (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) (often impossible to draw line 
between "ultimate facts," or issues of law, and evidentiary facts); cf Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 
448 U.S. at 288 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (dispositive issues in 
tort actions frequently mixed questions of law and fact; actions satisfying one state's standard of care might 
be negligent in another state). Issues sometimes characterized as issues of "ultimate fact" actually involve 
the application of law to fact. If, however, a particular tribunal's determination rests on its application of 
law to fact, and therefore on its interpretation of the law it applies, a requirement that the tribunal's 
determination be given effect in subsequent proceedings carries with it the power of the initial tribunal to 
bind subsequent courts on issues of law. If this is true, there is little reason to prevent the tribunal from 
binding subsequent courts on other issues of law, even when they are divorced from issues of fact. 
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employment within the scope of "interstate commerce." 161 Alternatively, the 
court could conclude that even on the same facts, the employment was within 
the scope of interstate commerce, and therefore created obligations under 
FELA. Such a conclusion might constitute reversible error as an incorrect 
interpretation of FELA, but not as a denial of full faith and credit to the Iowa 
determination.162 
The Schendel case differs from the illustration because of the legal 
conclusion in the Iowa proceeding that only intrastate commerce was 
involved, and therefore that FELA did not preempt state law on the subject. 
It is only that legal conclusion that prevented relitigation of the issue in 
Minnesota. The Supreme Court's holding in Schendel that the full faith and 
credit clause prohibited relitigation implies, therefore, that conclusions of 
law, not just findings of fact, rendered in administrative proceedings are 
entitled to full faith and credit. The plurality's analysis in Thomas missed this 
point. 
Moreover, the Schendel opinion suggested no distinction between judicial 
and administrative proceedings. Nothing in Justice Sutherland's opinion 
implies that any less faith and credit is due administrative determinations 
than judicial ones. Throughout the opinion, he made references to the "Iowa 
court,"163 the "Iowa judgment,"164 and the "judicial power" 165 exercised 
under the Iowa workmen's compensation statute. One might ipfer that the 
Court accorded full faith and credit only to the Iowa court judgment that 
affirmed the workmen's compensation award, and not the award itself, but 
the Court dispelled that inference in its discussion of the Elder case. Had it 
wished to distinguish administrative from judicial proceedings, the Court 
could have rested its decision on that ground because no court had rendered 
judgment in Eider's workmen's compensation proceeding. Instead, the Court 
emphasized that because of the pendency of administrative review, Elder had 
received no enforceable administrative award. 166 Any distinction between 
final administrative awards and judgments .enforcing those awards is sense-
less, as Justice White pointed out in his Thomas concurrence, 167 if its only 
effect is to force cautious litigants concerned about the full faith and credit 
161. Suppose, for instance, that Hope had worked outside Iowa for twenty of the twenty-five days 
preceding his accident, and that his job entailed moving constantly from project to project to assist in 
particular aspects of his employer's business. No res judicata or collateral estoppel doctrine would prevent 
the Minnesota courts from considering these facts and concluding that Hope was engaged in interstate 
commerce. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). 
162. The facts found in the hypothetical Iowa proceeding possess no intrinsic significance. They are 
significant in the subsequent Minnesota proceeding only to the extent that FELA makes them significant. 
The Iowa proceeding, however, never determined the significance of the facts found for FELA purposes. 
The Minnesota court is, therefore, free to make that determination for itself. If it errs by attaching too little 
significance to the facts found in Iowa, while conceding that those facts have been established, its error is 
merely one of interpreting FELA. It is FELA, not the Iowa proceeding, that determines the significance of 
the Iowa facts for FELA purposes. 
163. 270 U.S. at 617. 
164. Id. at 616, 618. 
165. Id. at 616. 
166. Id. at 623. 
167. See 448 U.S. at 286 (White, J ., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (plurality's 
rule must allow subsequent recovery even if award upheld by court; otherwise employers would simply 
seek judicial review in first forum). 
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effect of administrative awards to seek judicial confirmation of administrative 
action. 
In sum, there is little support in Schendel itself for the Thomas plurality's 
interpretation of that case. Moreover, in Magnolia the Supreme Court treated 
Schendel as if it had placed administrative determinations on the same footing 
as court judgments for full faith and credit purposes. 168 It is significant that 
even in Mccartin, despite the Court's evident desire to abandon Magnolia, 
and despite its perversion of full faith and credit principles to distinguish the 
case, the Court did not retreat from the position that final administrative 
adjudications are entitled to the same full faith and credit as court judg-
ments.169 
B. THE POLICY BASES 
The Thomas plurality concluded that "the critical differences" between 
courts of general jurisdiction and administrative agencies justified different 
treatment for full faith and credit purposes. 170 In order to be "critical," 
however, any differences must implicate the basic policy behind the full faith 
and credit clause-the need for national unification within the context of a 
federal system. 
If national unification is at the heart of the full faith and credit clause, 
whether a determination issues from an administrative body is of no 
importance. As long as a state employs a method of resolving disputes that is 
constitutionally adequate, the state's resolutions should be no less binding 
168. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 446 (1943) (citing Schendel for proposition 
that workmen's compensation award stands on same footing as judgment). 
169. Cf. Industrial Comm'n v. Mccartin, 330 U.S. at 630 (employee's reservation of rights in second 
state distinguished award from "ordinary judgment or decree") (emphasis added). Also relevant to tne 
issue of full faith and credit to administrative determinations is Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). 
In the Broderick case, New York's Superintendent of Banks brought an action in the New Jersey courts to 
recover assessments he had levied, pursuant to New York Jaw, against stockholders of the Bank of the 
United States who resided in New Jersey. Id. at 638. The New Jersey courts, citing a New Jersey statute, 
refused to entertain the action, and the plaintiff-Superintendent appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 639. 
In an opinion by Justice Brandeis, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the full faith and credit 
clause required New Jersey to entertain the action. Id. at 643. It did not decide what effect the 
Superintendent's assessments need be given in the New Jersey proceedings. Id. at 646. The Court did, 
however, make several assertions that bear on the problem. Justice Brandeis wrote: 
The fact that the assessment here in question was made under statutory direction by an 
administrative officer does not preclude the application of the full faith and credit clause. If 
the assessment had been made in a liquidation proceeding conducted by a court, New Jersey 
would have been obliged to enforce it, although the stockholders sued had not been made 
parties to the proceedings, and, being nonresidents, could not have been personally served 
with process. 
Id. at 644. Justice Brandeis based these conclusions on the requirement that sister states give full credit to 
"public acts," not to judgments. Id. If that conclusion is sound, the Broderick discussion serves only to 
limit state choice-of-law decisions. Only the state of incorporation may impose liabilities on stockholders of 
domestic corporations, and if Justice Brandeis' analysis of the Broderick problem is correct, that liability 
must be enforced in all states. If full faith and credit to public acts does not extend so far, however, perhaps 
Justice Brandeis' conclusions can be supported under the principles of full faith and credit to judgments. 
The court did not reach these questions. 
170. 448 U.S. at 281. 
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because the rendering tribunal is not a traditional court. It is the determina-
tion, not the determiner, that requires full faith and credit. 
There are, of course, differences between courts established as a part of the 
judicial branch of government and administrative agencies operating within 
the executive branch. Perhaps if the full faith and credit clause were intended 
to foster respect for sister-state judgments, rather than to further national 
unification, there might be reason to accord greater respect to a judicial 
determination than to a less formal administrative decision. Even the Thomas 
plurality, however, was unwilling to adopt that basis for full faith and 
credit. 171 Whatever differences there may be between state courts and state 
administrative tribunals, those differences do not appear to possess any 
federal constitutional significance. State governments are free to distribute the 
judicial business of the state among the various branches of state govenment 
as they see fit without restriction by the federal Constitution. If an individual 
state chooses to vest some or most of what has been traditionally judicial 
power in administrative agencies, that choice ought not to carry federal 
constitutional implications. Separation of powers in state government, in 
contrast to the federal government, is not a matter of federal constitutional 
law. 172 A state's choice to vest decisionmaking power in a body not called a 
court should not render that body's determinations less entitled to enforce-
ment in sister states. 
Administrative bodies issue a wide variety of determinations that are not at 
all like court judgments. Not all of these determinations, many of them 
legislative in nature, others made ex parte, can or should be enforceable in 
sister states. Traditional full faith and credit principles, however, should 
suffice to prevent enforcement of administrative determinations when en-
forcement would be unfair or unconstitutional. 173 Unless the administrative 
171. See id. at 284-85 (compensation proceedings should be informal to accommodate state interest in 
providing efficient recovery). 
172. Aside from the guarantee clause, which requires the United States to guarantee every state a 
republican form of government, U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 4, the United States Constitution docs not prescribe 
any particular form of government for its constituent states. Of course, individual state constitutions may 
require the same separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitution for the federal 
government. The scope of the separation of powers doctrine in any individual state, however, is a matter of 
state law. 
173. Perhaps the foremost protection is the general full faith and credit principle that a determination is 
conclusive in a sister state only to the extent that it is conclusive in the state of its rendition. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1738 (1976) (acts, records and judicial proceedings entitled to same full faith and credit as in state of 
rendition). The res judicata principles of the individual states provide a safeguard against unwarranted 
enforcement of administrative determinations in sister states. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Juoo-
MENTS § 131 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980), which provides, in part: 
Id. 
A determination by an administrative tribunal is conclusive under the rules of res judicata 
only insofar as the proceeding resulting in the determination entailed the essential elements of 
adjudication, including: (a) Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the 
adjudication . .. ; (b) The right ... to present evidence and legal argument . . . and fair 
opportunity to rebut evidence and argument . . . ; (c) A formulation of issues and law and fact 
in terms of the application of rules with respect to specified parties concerning a specific 
transaction, situation, or status, or a specific series thereof; (d) A rule of finality . .. ; and (e) 
Such other procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the proceeding a sufficient 
means of conclusively determining the matter in question . . .. 
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body has a basis for personal jurisdiction over the parties and complies with 
constitutional notice requirements, for example, its determination need not, 
and indeed may not, be accorded full faith and credit. 174 Similarly, if the 
administrative determination is not final, but remains subject to review or to 
modification by the agency, traditional full faith and credit principles would 
not require sister-state enforcement. 175 The principle remains simple: a state's 
choice to delegate decisionmaking authority to one body rather than another 
should be of no importance for full faith and credit purposes; what is 
significant is the nature of the decision itself. 
C. THE LIMITED JURISDICTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES 
The Thomas opinion emphasized one characteristic of the Industrial 
Commission of Virginia that does distinguish it from courts of general 
jurisdiction: the commission's jurisdiction "is limited to questions arising 
under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act." 176 The commission, 
therefore, lacked the power to evaluate the claim that Thomas was entitled to 
compensation under the law of the District of Columbia. Justice Stevens 
concluded that "[s]ince [the commission] was not requested, and had no 
authority, to pass on petitioner's rights under District of Columbia law, there 
can be no constitutional objection to a fresh adjudication of those rights." 177 
Justice Stevens' conclusion, despite its great superficial appeal, proves too 
much. First, limited jurisdiction is not a quality peculiar to administrative 
bodies. Numerous state courts, such as small claims courts or probate courts, 
are limited in jurisdiction either by amount in controversy or by subject 
matter. Judgments of these courts are no less entitled to full faith and credit 
because of their limited jurisdiction. The plurality's rationale in Thomas 
would require that these judgments, too, be treated differently from judg-
ments of courts of general jurisdiction. 
Moreover, describing the Virginia commission as having limited jurisdic-
tion is somewhat misleading. Generally, a court of limited jurisdiction is 
deprived of judicial power that instead is allocated to some other court or 
courts within the state. If such a court of limited jurisdiction is not authorized 
to deal with a particular matter or if the court's determinations are subject to 
de novo review by another body within the state, full faith and credit would 
not require a sister state to accord any more effect to the determinations than 
it would receive in the rendering state. Because the determination of the court 
of limited jurisdiction might not exhaust the judicial process available within 
the state of rendition, the full faith and credit clause, with its purpose of 
fostering national unification, also would not prevent relitigation in other 
states. 
174. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958) (Delaware court entitled to refuse full faith and 
credit to Florida judgment because Florida without jurisdiction over indispensable party to original 
action). 
175. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. I, 26 (1910) (absolute judgment for alimony not subject to 
modification in rendering state entitled to full faith and credit. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUOOMENTS § 131(2), Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) (requirement of finality applies to 
determinations of administrative agency; to determine finality, reference must be made to procedures of 
agency). 
176. 448 U.S. at 282. 
177. Id. at 283. 
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The Virginia Commission, however, does not have limited jurisdiction in 
this sense. No other court or agency in Virginia has power to provide any 
remedy in a case within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The 
Virginia legislature has granted to the commission the exclusive power to deal 
with workmen's compensation cases. 178 Whatever remedy is available in 
Virginia is available through the commission. 
In furtherance of the goal of national unity, other states should honor the 
Virginia Commission's disposition of any dispute. This conclusion is subject 
to criticism because it deprives a litigant in Thomas' position of the right to 
litigate any choice-of-law questions and any issues of substantive law of states 
other than Virginia. This deprivation, however, is not due to the limited 
jurisdiction of the administrative body. Virginia could have accomplished the 
same result by providing, either legislatively or judicially, a choice-of-law rule 
requiring the application of Virginia law in all workmen's compensation 
claims that stem from an injury in Virginia. Such a choice-of-law rule would, 
whatever its wisdom, be entirely constitutional. 179 A judgment of a Virginia 
court of general jurisdiction rendered according to the terms of such a rule 
effectively would foreclose the right of an injured workman to litigate any 
issues, choice-of-law or substantive, that the workman would like to raise in 
any other state. 
Because constitutional limitations on choice-of-law remain relatively insig-
nificant, any state that chooses to be provincial in its choice-of-law doctrine 
can, through the full faith and credit clause, impose its provinciality on other 
states and on any litigants who proceed to judgment within the state. There 
appears, therefore, to be little additional unfairness in precluding further 
litigation after an initial determination by an administrative agency that lacks 
the power to make choice-of-law decisions. Any possible unfairness results 
from the wide latitude that the Constitution permits the states in making 
choice-of-law decisions, not from the limited jurisdiction of administrative 
agencies. 180 
178. See VA. CODE§ 65; 1-92 (1980) (all questions arising under act determined by commission). 
179. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-501 (1939) 
(state where injury occurred may apply own compensation law rather than that where state employer and 
employee resided and contracted). 
180. As additional support for its proposition that a litigant before an administrative body lacking 
power to make choice-of-law determinations should be able to relitigate those issues, the Thomas plurality 
cited a tentative draft of the Second Restatement of Judgments. 448 U.S. at 283 n.29. Section 61.2(c) of the 
Restatement sets forth an exception to the general rule that claims are extinguished in a judgment. Under 
the Restatement a claim is not extinguished when, 
the plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or 
form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdictions of 
the courts . .. and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on that theory or to seek 
that remedy . . . . 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.2(l)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978). 
The Restatement provision cited in Thomas in fact does not directly support the Thomas analysis: the 
provision concerns the res judicata effect of a judgment within a state, not the extraterritorial effect of a 
judgment mandated by the full faith and credit clause. The issues of the intrastate and extraterritorial 
effects of judgments are not only different, they are not even analogous. When a state divides jurisdiction 
among its courts in a fashion that prevents a litigant from raising all claims in one court, there is no 
implication that the state intends to force the litigant to choose from among his claims. Instead, the state 
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In sum, although the limited jurisdiction of administrative bodies provides 
a superficially attractive basis for permitting sister states to relitigate issues 
resolved in the original forum, the Thomas plurality's analysis of the issue 
does not withstand close scrutiny. Moreover, the Thomas opinion provides no 
alternative basis for distinguishing between court judgments and administra-
tive determinations for full faith and credit purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. presented the Supreme Court with a 
difficult problem. An injured workman had sought and received compensa-
tion for his injury in a forum less generous to him than another available 
forum. The workman did this, in all probability, because he was poorly 
advised or not advised at all. The natural tendency of any court would be to 
avoid punishing the injured workman for mistakes resulting from his lack of 
legal sophistication. As Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, had the employee 
been the victim of employer coercion in any way, the case would have been 
simple because the Virginia statute would have permitted a court to vacate the 
award. 181 Even in the absence of an employer's abuse of greater bargaining 
power, the employee's case is a sympathetic one. 
The Thomas plurality pursued two paths in its attempt to permit plaintiff 
to secure additional relief. Unfortunately, the plurality failed to acknowledge 
that both paths led to dead ends. Instead, the Court raised a panoply of full 
faith and credit questions to which it has provided no satisfactory answers. 
First, the plurality's attempt at balancing state interests was both unprece-
dented and unwarranted in the context of granting full faith and credit to 
has merely assigned some claims to one forum and others to a different forum, with the logical implication, 
recognized by the Restatement, that a judgment in the first forum should not extinguish claims that the 
state mandates must be heard in a different forum. 
In stark contrast, the delegation to a workmen's compensation commission of the judicial power to 
adjudicate employees' claims is a decision by the state to foreclose plaintiff from seeking additional relief. It 
is not the limited jurisdiction of the court or administrative body that prevents plaintiff from seeking relief 
in the first action; it is the decision by the state not to authorize any judicial or administrative body, 
including a court of general jurisdiction, to provide relief other than the relief available in the first forum. 
The Restatement provision, then, is not relevant to the analysis offered in the Thomas opinion. The 
argument of the plurality is weakened further by reliance on section 131 of the Second Restatement of 
Judgments, which specifically deals with administrative adjudications. That provision does not include a 
provision parallel to· section 61.2(l)(c), despite the greater likelihood that "limited jurisdiction" problems 
will arise in connection with administrative determinations. The only relevant exceptions included in 
section 13 I are those stated in subsection ( 4): 
[A]dministrative determinations should not be given preclusive effect: if according preclusive 
effect to determination of the issue would be incompatible with a legislative policy that: 
(a) The determinations of the tribunal adjudicating the issue be specially expeditious; or 
(b) The tribunal in which the issue subsequently arises be free to make an independent 
determination of the issue in question. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(4) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980). 
In Thomas, neither of these exceptions would avail the injured workmen because no legislative policy of 
Virginia would be incompatible with giving preclusive effect to the administrative determination. In fact, 
Virginia formulated its policy specifically to ensure that the administrative determination has preclusive 
effect. Again, however, because Restatement section 61.2(!)(c) deals not with full faith and credit 
problems, but only intrastate res judicata questions, the section is of limited utility in the Thomas context. 
181. 448 U.S. at 294 (Rehnquist, J. , with Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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judicial proceedings, as opposed to public acts. The Court's approach to 
enforcement of judgments is fraught with uncertainty, and is in direct conflict 
with the oft-stated purpose of the full faith and credit clause-the need for 
national unification within the federal system. 
Second, the Court's attempt to distinguish between court judgments and 
administrative determinations finds no justification in the policies that 
underlie the full faith and credit clause. The mere fact that a determination is 
"administrative" rather than "judicial" should not have significance for full 
faith and credit purposes, especially when the distribution of state adjudica-
tory authority is a matter of state law that the Constitution leaves largely 
restricted. 
Of course, five members of the Court explicitly rejected the Thomas 
plurality's analysis. These five justices disagreed only on the precedential 
effect to be accorded the McCartin case, which all the justices conceded rested 
on, at best, "questionable foundations." 182 Otherwise, the five justices would 
constitute a majority, in an appropriate case, for repudiating the doctrinal 
heresy expressed by Justice Stevens in the Thomas case, and more impor-
tantly, for elimip.ating the potential practical problems that flow from the 
Thomas plurality's evisceration of the full faith and credit clause. 
182. Id. at 289 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J. concurring in judgment). 
